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U.S. Tobacco Goes Abroad: Section 301 of the 1974
Trade Act as a Tool for Achieving Access to
Foreign Tobacco Markets
I. Introduction
Attracted by the prospect of unexploited international tobacco
markets and by an increasingly stagnant and sometimes hostile do-
mestic market, U.S. tobacco companies are interested now more than
ever in increasing exports and commanding a larger share of world
tobacco sales. Currently, U.S. exports of tobacco are increasing' but
without a significant corresponding gain in world market share.2
One major reason for the failure to increase market share is that
many foreign markets targeted for tobacco exports are partially or
completely closed due to protectionist trade barriers erected by for-
eign governments. 3 There are relatively few effective measures avail-
I U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1988 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Ta-
ble No. 1349 at 775 [hereinafter 1988 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. The value of U.S. tobacco
exports increased from $679 million in 1970, to $2.1 billion in 1979, and then to $2.7
billion in 1986. Id. The Tobacco Institute estimated 1987 exports of tobacco at $3.4 bil-
lion. TOBACCO INSTITUTE, TOBACCO INDUSTRY PROFILE 1988 3 (1987) [hereinafter To-
BACCO PROFILE].
2 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1989 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Ta-
ble No. 1115 at 643. U.S. exports of unmanufactured tobacco, as a percentage of world
exports, increased only from 17.5% in 1984, to 17.6% in 1985 and actually decreased to
16.1% in 1986. Id.
3 The United States Trade Representative (USTR) reports annually on the existence
of foreign trade barriers to U.S. commerce. In the 1989 report the USTR classified trade
barriers into eight categories, six of which are potentially relevant to the export of tobacco.
The six relevant categories are: import policies; standards, testing, labelling and certifica-
tion; government procurement; export subsidies; investment barriers; and other barriers.
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1989 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 1-2. The two remaining categories are intellectual
property-related barriers and services barriers. Id.
The USTR has identified at least ten countries (or trading entities) that currently im-
pose trade barriers on U.S. tobacco exports. Australia imposes minimum local content
requirements. Id. at 13. China has quantitative restrictions on the import ofcigarettes. Id.
at 41. The European Community maintains high tariffs on cigarettes. Id. at 58. In 1986,
Japan agreed to remove its cigarette tariff, modify its cigarette distribution system, and
eliminate discriminatory excise tax payments. These concessions have not been fully im-
plemented, however, and restrictions on tobacco shipping still remain. OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1987 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOR-
EIGN TRADE BARRIERS 189-90. Korea had completely closed its market to foreign ciga-
rettes until 1987, when the United States was granted access to 1% of the market. Id. at
200-01. New Zealand imposes high tariffs on tobacco products. Id. at 233. Spain main-
tains restrictive shipping practices. Id. at 277. In 1985, Taiwan had high tariffs and dis-
criminatory pricing practices resulting in U.S. sales of cigarettes being restricted to less
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able to private U.S. companies that help force open inaccessible
markets or provide relief from the allegedly unfair foreign trading
practices. Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act 4 is one measure that
has recently emerged as a prominent weapon for U.S. exporters.
Section 301 enables private individuals or companies to petition the
USTR to carry out retaliatory economic sanctions against foreign
governments that have unfairly restricted trade with the United
States.5 Section 301 proceedings became increasingly prevalent
under the Reagan administration, 6 a trend that is likely to continue
now that recent amendments to section 301 require mandatory in-
vestigation and response by the federal government in some cases. 7
This Comment examines some of the reasons for the tobacco indus-
try's push for greater access to international markets, the barriers
that exist to such access, and the use of section 301 as a tool to ob-
tain market access.
II. Overview of the Current Domestic Tobacco Market-Reasons to
Look Abroad
Although U.S. tobacco companies are not financially imperiled,
three characteristics of the domestic tobacco market illustrate stag-
nation and hostility in the domestic market as compared to the inter-
national market. These characteristics are a decline in smoking
associated with a heightened awareness of the health risks of smok-
ing, increased governmental regulation, and greater exposure to lia-
bility for tobacco-related injuries. These easily recognizable
characteristics help establish a context for the industry's desire to
expand internationally. Despite relative domestic unease and the de-
sire for international expansion, it is unlikely that the U.S. market,
with its fifty million smokers, 8 will be neglected by its domestic
producers.
than 1% of the domestic market. Id. at 305-06. Thailand has a domestic cigarette monop-
oly, keeps its market closed to foreign brands, and restricts imported leaf for use in Thai
tobacco products. Id. at 309. Yugoslavia taxes cigarettes progressively, resulting in a 2%
U.S. share of the Yugoslav market. Id. at 335.
4 Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (as amended by Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301(a), 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1107, 1164) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-19) [hereinaf-
ter Trade Act of 1988].
5 Id. § 302(a)(1). See infra notes 66-89 and accompanying text (describing the scope
of § 301 and its procedure).
6 See Bello & Holmer, US. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 10: Significant Recent Develop-
ments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases, 21 INT'L LAW. 211, 215-16 (1987).
7 Trade Act of 1988, supra note 4, § 301(a). These amendments remove a large de-
gree of discretion on the part of the USTR with regard to the timing of retaliatory action
and the scope of the action itself. This, in effect, guarantees to petitioners with valid com-
plaints under the mandatory provisions some sort of executive action. For discussion of
the merits of these amendments, see infra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
8 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SMOKING, TOBACCO AND HEALTH: A
FACT BOOK 2 (1987).
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A. Declining Total Market and Increasing Health Awareness
The first, and most compelling, negative characteristic of the
U.S. tobacco market is that U.S. consumers are using substantially
less tobacco now than at any time since the turn of the century. 9 The
high-water mark for per capita consumption of cigarettes was 1963,
when the average U.S. smoker consumed 4,345 cigarettes per year.' 0
Consumption of cigarettes has decreased steadily from 4,100 per
capita in 1975, to 3,200 per capita in 1987.11 Despite the decline in
.smoking, however, 1987 was a record year for U.S. expenditures
($35.5 billion) on tobacco products. 12 There are at least two reasons
for these apparently contradictory statistics. First, the average price
for cigarettes rose five cents from 1986 to 1987.13 Second, because
tobacco is addictive, demand for cigarettes is relatively inelastic. This
results in relatively small decreases in consumption of tobacco de-
spite increasing costs. Thus, per capita consumption of cigarettes in
the United States is decreasing and markets with potential to expand
(e.g., those in developing countries) are becoming relatively more
attractive.
The impact of health awareness on smoking was relatively insig-
nificant at first, but has been growing in importance since the mid
1960s. Without question, the Surgeon General's 1964 report on
smoking 14 was a key factor in convincing the public that the risks of
smoking are real. 15 Since 1964, the Surgeon General has reported
on the health consequences of smoking with increasing regularity
and with ever more compelling results. By 1987, many of the early
findings had been reconfirmed and new risks had been indentified.
16
9 There are several reasons for this trend. Probably the most important reason is
that people are now more aware of the health risks of using tobacco and choose to con-
sume less. Other explanations include: improvements in industry technology resulting in
less tobacco waste in production; increased production of healthier low-tar cigarettes con-
taining less tobacco; and the use by some producers of less expensive foreign tobacco as
filler in production of U.S. cigarettes. See W. FINGER, THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN TRANSI-
TION: POLICIES FOR THE 1980s 119 (1981) [hereinafter FINGER].
10 TOBACCO PROFILE, supra note 1, at I.
I I U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1989 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Ta-
ble No. 1290 at 737.
12 TOBACCO PROFILE, supra note 1, at 1.
13 Id.
14 SURGEON GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMI'TEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964).
15 SURGEON GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE SUR-
GEON GENERAL'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH (1964). The 1964 report
concluded that cigarette smoking is a factor in oral cancer, and cancer of the lungs, larynx,
esophogus, and urinary bladder. In some cases the Surgeon General stopped short of
declaring a causal link but did conclude that an "association" exists between smoking and
cancer. The report also declared smoking a factor in chronic bronchitis, pulmonary em-
physema, bronchopulmonary disease, cardiovascular disease, and low infant birth weight
in babies born to mothers who smoke. As a result of these factors, the Surgeon General
concluded that smoking contributed to increased death rates.
16 See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SMOKING, TOBACCO AND HEALTH:
1989]
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These findings alerted the U.S. public to the reality of the hazards of
smoking.
The United States is certainly not the only nation to decrease
per capita consumption of tobacco due to the health risks of smok-
ing. Japan and the European Community, two of the United States'
major trading partners in tobacco, have also trimmed per capita con-
sumption of tobacco.17 Given the widespread knowledge of the dan-
gers of smoking, how can the international market for tobacco be any
more attractive than the domestic market? One answer is that many
parts of the world, particularly developing countries, lack the same
degree of health consciousness that exists today in the United States
and Europe.' 8 Perhaps people in these areas of the world are puf-
fing along in the same blissful ignorance that U.S. smokers enjoyed
prior to 1964. Another answer is that in some areas exposure to the
power of Western culture and advertising has made the risks of
smoking seem worthwhile in exchange for the image of maturity, at-
tractiveness, and virility that often is associated with smoking.' 9 A
final answer is that perhaps the governments of developing countries
cannot afford to give up the tax revenues of the tobacco industry
while at the same time spending money to promote health cam-
paigns such as those in the United States. 20
These answers are supported by many reports in the 1980s indi-
cating that per capita consumption of tobacco is increasing in the
third world market. For example, the increase in tobacco consump-
tion in developing countries since the 1970s has been estimated at
between two percent2' and five percent.2 2 From 1970 to 1980, con-
sumption in Africa increased an estimated thirty-three percent; in
Latin America during the same period a twenty-four percent increase
was estimated; and in Asia (excluding Japan) the increase was
twenty-three percent. 23 These figures are even more encouraging to
exporters because this market contains more than one-half of the
world's population. 24 Thus, whereas awareness of health risks may
be dampening enthusiasm for smoking in the United States, Europe,
A FACT BOOK (1987). In addition to the 1964 dangers, smoking has been related to
chronic obstructive lung disease and is associated with cancer of the bladder, pancreas,
and kidney. Id. at 9.
17 FINGER, supra note 9, at 127.
18 Id. at 151; see also Huebner, Tobacco's Lucrative Third World Invasion, 11 Bus. & Soc'Y
REV. 49 (1980).
19 FINGER, supra note 9, at 123. Cigarette advertising in the United States certainly
seems to suggest that smoking is associated with a fashionable, successful image. This is
probably one reason for the continued high levels of smoking in the United States today
despite the acute awareness of health risks.
20 Id. at 151.
21 Id. at 123.
22 Id. at 168 (United Nations estimate).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 151.
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and Japan, other regions of the world are evidently not so affected.
The result is that the potential market opportunities in the test of the
world are very attractive indeed. 25
B. Legislative Aspects of Market Hostility
A second market characteristic illustrating a certain degree of
domestic hostility is the growing amount of legislation being passed
that burdens the tobacco industry. This characteristic has been evi-
dent since 1971, when cigarette advertising was banned from the air-
waves. 26 Cigarette advertising is not only banned from some media,
it also is highly regulated with respect to labelling.27 In addition to
warnings on cigarette packages, the federal government has initiated
a program directed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to "inform the public of any dangers to human health presented by
smoking."' 28 Legislative hostility to smoking is also evidenced by the
fact that, as of 1987, at least forty-two states had enacted laws that
limit or prohibit smoking in public places.2 9 One significant recent
federal action against smoking was an FAA regulation effective April
23, 1988, prohibiting smoking on all domestic airline flights of less
than two hours. 30 On occasions where the federal or state govern-
ments have not acted to prohibit or limit smoking, private litigants
have often sought to have the courts prohibit smoking in certain
25 It should be noted that zealous pursuit of increased exports of tobacco products is
not universally applauded. Expanded world trade is usually seen as beneficial to all con-
cerned, but in the case of trade in tobacco products special considerations arise. For ex-
ample, should the United States encourage the export of substances like tobacco that are
known to be exceedingly unhealthy? Should explicit warnings accompany tobacco ex-
ports, especially to areas that are still largely unaware of the risks? What responsibility, if
any, does the United States have to foreign consumers of dangerous U.S. products? Also,
cigarettes and other tobacco products are luxury items that arguably should not be atop
the trading list of countries whose citizens are undernourished and whose technology is
underdeveloped, but the world of trade does not always place the highest value on prod-
ucts that are "good" for people. It is unrealistic to believe that in the near future trade in
tobacco products will be curtailed significantly because of the long-term effects of smok-
ing. Even so, the concerns raised here are worthy of consideration and reflection in the
course of the material that follows.
26 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222 § 2, 84 Stat. 89
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988)).
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1333 (1988). Warnings to consumers are required on each
package of cigarettes and on advertisements of cigarettes. The warnings must be conspic-
uous and are meant to be very clear indicators of the risks accompanying smoking. For
example, one of the following four warnings is required by § 1333 for cigarette packages:
"Surgeon General's Warning: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema,
And May Complicate Pregnancy; Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risk to
Your Health; Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth,
and Low Birth Weight; Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide." Id. § 1333.
28 15 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1988).
29 S. RIDLEY, THE STATE OF THE STATES 25-26 (1988). The eight states that, as of
1987, have not enacted laws prohibiting smoking in public places are: Alabama, Illinois,
Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming.
30 53 Fed. Reg. 12,358 (1988).
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public places.31 These efforts have generally been unsuccessful 3 2
but they do reflect strong antismoking sentiment.
The United States is still unsurpassed as a market for tobacco
products. However, the mood towards cigarettes and smoking has
grown very negative. Both nonsmokers and the federal and state
governments have been active in making sure that smokers know the
risks involved and in seeking to establish a "zero tolerance" for
smoking. This hostile attitude, accompanied by increasingly restric-
tive legislation, makes foreign markets ever more attractive.
Not all legislation directed at the tobacco industry is hostile,
however. In fact, Congress has recognized that the United States
benefits from the net trade surplus associated with tobacco exports3 3
and has made the export of tobacco products easier by exempting
tobacco exports from the strict warnings and labelling requirements
on domestic cigarettes. 34 We see, then, that even though state and
federal legislation work to some extent to restrain domestic tobacco
consumption, exports of tobacco are encouraged by Congress. For
Congress the dangers of smoking must be peculiarly U.S.
phenomena,
C. Potential Tort Liability
The last important domestic signal of hostility towards the to-
bacco industry is a recent landmark case in which Antonio Cip-
polone, widower of a long-time smoker, was awarded $400,000 in
damages against Liggett Group, Inc., a manufacturer of cigarettes.3 5
Mr. Cippolone brought an action against Liggett, Phillip Morris,
Inc., and Lorillard, Inc., seeking damages personally and on behalf
of his wife's estate. Mrs. Cippolone had smoked Liggett's cigarettes
for over forty years and died of lung cancer in 1983. The jury
awarded $400,000 to Mr. Cippolone on the basis of violation of an
express warranty associated with Liggett's cigarette advertisements.
31 See, e.g., Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District, 418 F. Supp. 716,
721 (E.D. La. 1976), afftd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979)
(no fundamental right to have air free of cigarette smoke); Federal Employees for Non-
Smokers Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem. 598 F.2d 310
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979) (restriction of smoking in Federal build-
ings to designated areas is invalid); GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256
S.E.2d 477 (1979) (nonsmokers not entitled on Constitutional grounds to injunction re-
quiring county to ban smoking in county buildings).
32 Contra Shimp v. NewJersey Bell Telephone Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408
(Ch. Div. 1976).
33 Tobacco exports aided the U.S. balance of payments by $2.18 billion in 1987. To-
BACCO PROFILE, supra note 1, at 3.
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 1340 (1988). Exempting tobacco exports from the labelling re-
quirement is generally beneficial to the industry, but it also calls to mind the objections
mentioned supra note 25, regarding the promotion of tobacco exports to foreign countries
that may not be completely aware of the health risks of smoking.
35 Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.NJ. 1988).
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Cippolone is significant because it is the first successful case of its kind
against the tobacco industry. 36
In the immediate aftermath of Cippolone, many people were con-
vinced that this stunning breakthrough would result in a deluge of
new cases against the tobacco industry. 37 Realizing that the tobacco
industry was no longer judgment-proof38 and that cases could now
be won against the industry, a wave of optimism swept over the
plaintiff's bar.39 Several reports indicated that tobacco was destined
to go the way of the Dalkon Shield and asbestos.40 Others predicted
that Cippolone opened the door for punitive damages. 41 The general
feeling was that, even if Cippolone was not the last word, the system
for mass torts would eventually catch up with the tobacco
companies .42
Regardless of whether the actual number of lawsuits com-
menced against the tobacco industry increases over the long run, the
fact remains that, in Cippolone, a cigarette manufacturer was held lia-
ble where no liability had been found before. The litigation result-
ing from Cippolone may best be described as "not a disabling
onslaught, but a nagging fact of business life."'43 Even so, the poten-
tial of liability is another reason for the shift of attention towards
foreign markets.
III. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Remedy to Trade
Barriers
The benefits of international trade are maximized when trade is
free and open. In the years following World War II, U.S. industries
were the primary beneficiaries of world trade and enjoyed a position
atop the world's financial pyramid. 44 Over the years, though, the
U.S. position waned as developing countries asserted themselves. As
a result, the United States became more concerned with what was
36 Between the time- of printing and publishing this Comment, Cippolone was over-
ruled by the Third Circuit. Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 88-5784 (3d Cir. Jan. 5,
1990) (WESTLAW, Federal library, 3d Cir. file). The Third Circuit found error in the
jury's consideration of Mrs. Cippolone's post-1965 conduct as it related to comparative
fault; such conduct is related only to damages apportionment. The court also reopened
Mr. Cippolone's failure to warn and express warranty claims.
One result of the court's ruling is that the tobacco industry has wiped its record clean
of tort liability. Another result, though, is that Mr. Cippolone now has available a wider
range of claims against Liggett, Phillip Morris, and Lorillard, Inc.
37 See, e.g., 121 N.J.L.J. 1309, 1309 (1988); 122 N.J.L.J. 745, 745 (1988).
38 Used in the nontraditional sense of the term, meaning "invulnerable" to suit'.
39 See, e.g., Moss, The (Smoking) Chain is Broken: First Judgment Against Tobacco Firms to
Signal More Suits, 74 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 28.
40 See, e.g., id. at 28, 29; 121 N.J.L.J. 1309, 1328 (1988).
41 121 N.J.L.J. 1309, 1309 (1988).
42 Gerber, Cippolone Signals the End of Era, 121 N.J.LJ. 1309, 1333 (1988).
43 Chicago Daily L. Bull., Sept. 12, 1988, at 14, col. 2.
44 See Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility Against Alleged Unfair
Trade Practices by the Japanese Government, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 492 (1987).
1989]
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becoming a one-way flow of trade. Over the last decade U.S. export-
ers have found it increasingly difficult to penetrate foreign markets,
yet at the same time U.S. markets.have been inundated with foreign
products. The natural result has been a severe decline in the U.S.
balance of trade. The United States perceived the erection of for-
eign trade barriers such as import quotas, tariffs and local content
requirements to be a primary reason for the one-way flow of trade
and reacted with legislation intended to help open foreign markets.
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act was one important product of this
legislative reaction. 45
The following sections of this Comment contain a brief intro-
duction to section 301,46 a review of the history and purpose of sec-
tion 301, 4 7 and a look at the substantive and procedural
requirements involved in a section 301 petition/investigation. 48
Then there will be a description of cases in which the tobacco indus-
try has used section 301 to obtain greater market access, 49 and a crit-
ical analysis of section 301 as a trade remedy. 50
A. Overview of Section 301
Section 301 contains broad authority conferred by Congress,
pursuant to Article II of the Constitution, 5' to the USTR. It permits
the USTR to take retaliatory action against foreign nations in order
to enforce the rights of the United States under trade agreements, 52
or in response to "act[s], polic[ies], or practice[s]" that "unjustifi-
ably, unreasonably, or discriminatorily burden or restrict United
States commerce." ' 53 An investigation by the USTR under section
301 may be mandatory54 or discretionary" and may be initiated
either by petition of an "interested person" 56 or by the USTR. 57
The USTR may respond by withdrawing trade agreement conces-
sions, imposing duties or other import restrictions, or negotiating
45 Trade Act of 1988, supra note 4, § 301.
46 See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 66-89 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 90-120 and accompanying text.
50 See infro notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
51 "The Congress shall have Power... [tio regulate Commerce with foreign Nations
*52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52 Trade Act of 1988, supra note 4, § 301(a)(1)(A). The USTR normally interprets
"trade agreement" to mean either the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 27 U.N.T.S. 19, or an agreement under § 3(a) of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (1982). See Bello & Holmer, U.S. Trade
Law and Policy Series No. 10: Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases, 21
INT'L LAW. 211, 212 n.3 (1987).
53 Trade Act of 1988, supra note 4, § 301(a)-(b).
54 Id. § 301(a).55 Id. § -301 (b).
56 Id. § 302(a)(1).
57 Id. § 302(b)(1)(A).
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agreements with the foreign country to remove the offending barri-
ers. 58 Thus, section 301 is potentially a powerful tool available to
benefit tobacco exporters, albeit indirectly, through both the threat
and imposition of retaliatory measures against a foreign country that
has unfairly closed its markets to U.S. tobacco exports.
B. History of Section 301
Executive power to respond to unfair foreign trade practices can
be traced back to 1794 when Congress granted President Washing-
ton the power to restrict imports and exports from foreign nations
when he felt they had discriminated against U.S. commerce. 59
Grants of similar retaliatory power have since been reaffirmed re-
peatedly.60 The predecessor of section 301 was section 252(c) of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allowed Presidential action in
response to improper foreign import restrictions. 61
There are two primary reasons for the existence and scope of
this statute permitting unilateral response to international unfair
trade practices. First, existing international fora for dispute resolu-
tion are not satisfactory. For example, it is argued that the executive
branch must be able to act outside the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) because much of GATT is either inappropriate
now or regularly breached. 62 Second, there are relatively few meas-
ures by which exporters can avail themselves of markets that are
closed due to the policies of a foreign government. In addition, ex-
ecutive action beyond countervailing duties and antidumping laws is
needed to deal with subsidized foreign exports when those goods are
reducing U.S. exports to third-country markets. 63 In order to meet
these needs and to boost U.S. exports, section 301 was created to
"provide the President with 'negotiating leverage' to 'insure fair and
equitable conditions for United States commerce' and 'to eliminate
[trade] barriers . . .and . . .distortion on a reciprocal basis.' ",64
Thus, the history and purpose of section 301 indicate that Con-
gress intended to give power to the President to defend U.S. oppor-
tunites for international trade. The manner in which the President
wields this power generates much critical attention and a pressing
58 Id. § 301(c)(1)(A)-(C).
59 Fisher & Steinhardt, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for U.S. Exporters of
Goods, Services, and Capital, 14 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 569, 573 n.18 (1982).
60 Id.; see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Godbaw, Reciprocity and its Implica-
tions for U.S. Trade Policy, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 691, 702-09 (1982).
61 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252, 76 Stat. 872, 879-80,
repealed by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43.
62 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 166, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7186, 7304 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1298].
63 H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 66, 67 (1973).
64 Note, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122, 1127 (1987) (quoting S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 62, at 7302).
1989] 447
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demand for results. Section 301 was amended in both 1984 and
1988,65 in order to fine tune the statute for more reliable and signifi-
cant results.
C. Substantive Elements of Section 301
1. When May Action Be Taken?
One of the most significant changes made to section 301 by the
1988 amendments deals with when the USTR may or must take ac-
tion. Prior to 1988, action under section 301 was entirely discretionary
regardless of the nature of the allegations or the origin of the peti-
tion. Now, however, action is mandatory on two occasions: (1) When
the USTR finds a denial of U.S. rights under a trade agreement, 66 or
(2) When the USTR finds that "an act, policy, or practice of a foreign
country-(i) violates, or . . . denies benefits to the United States
under any trade agreement, or (ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or
restricts United States commerce." 67 "Unjustifiable" acts are those
that violate the international legal rights of the United States, includ-
ing denial of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. 68 There are,
however, exceptions to mandatory action under section 301. For ex-
ample, if the United States receives an unfavorable ruling under
GATT regarding the denial of trade agreement benefits, the USTR
may refuse to exercise that option. In addition, if the USTR finds
that the foreign country is making progress in granting to the United
States its trade agreement rights, retaliation under section 301 may
be postponed or rejected. Other exceptions to mandatory retalia-
tion include: (1) where the foreign country has agreed either to
eliminate the "act, policy, or practice" or has agreed with the USTR
how best to remove the burden on commerce; (2) where it is impos-
sible for the foreign country to comply specifically with the trade
agreement but it has agreed to provide other compensatory trade
benefits; or (3) where action under section 301 would involve detri-
ment to the United States substantially-disproportionate to its bene-
fits, or when such action would cause serious harm to national
security.69
After the 1988 amendments, as before, the USTR may still take
discretionary action if he determines that "an act, policy, or practice of
a foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or re-
stricts U.S. commerce" and such action is appropriate. 70 "Unrea-
65 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304(a)-(c), (), 98 Stat. 3002-
05 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-16 (Supp. IV 1986)); Trade Act of 1988, supra note 4,
§ 301.
66 Trade Act of 1988, supra note 4, § 301(a)(1)(A).
67 Id. § 301(a)(I)(B).
68 Id. § 301(d)(4).
69 Id. § 301(a)(2).
70 Id. § 301(b) (emphasis added).
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sonable acts" do not necessarily violate international legal rights of
the United States, but must be "unfair and inequitable. ' 7 1 Such acts
include denial of fair opportunity for establishment of an enterprise,
denial of protection for intellectual property rights, toleration by for-
eign goverments of systematic anticompetitive activities, and export
targeting.72 In judging unreasonableness, the USTR considers the
economic development of the country, the "overall advancement" by
the foreign country of workers rights, and whether reciprocal oppor-
tunities are available for foreigners within the United States. 73 "Dis-
criminatory" acts include those which deny MFN treatment. 74
Regardless of whether the action is mandatory or discretionary, the
President may still advise the USTR regarding action taken to elimi-
nate the offending act. 75
The USTR is authorized under section 301 to retaliate by sus-
pending or withdrawing trade agreement benefits or by imposing du-
ties on goods or restrictions on services of the foreign country. 76 In
taking these actions, the USTR must give preference where feasible
to the imposition of duties77 and must limit the action to penalize
goods of the foreign country in an amount equal to the burden on
U.S. commerce. 78 Also, the action, though it must be nondiscrimina-
tory on the part of the United States, 79 may affect goods or services
of the foreign country whether or not such goods or services were
involved in the act or policy by the foreign government.80
2. Who May Initiate an Investigation?
An investigation may be initiated either upon a petition by an
"interested person" 8' or, regardless of the filing of a petition, by the
USTR. 82 A valid petition under section 301 must show the interest
being affected; the U.S. right (if under section 301(a)) being denied
under a trade agreement; the laws and regulations which are the sub-
ject of the petition; the foreign country with whom the United States
71 Id. § 301(d)(3)(A).
72 Id. § 301(d)(3)(B).
73 Id. § 301(d)(3)(C)-(D).
74 Id. § 301(d)(5).
75 Id. § 301(a)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(2). Prior to 1988, all action was within the discretion of
the President. The 1988 amendments transferred the authority from the President to the
USTR and made some action mandatory. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
76 Trade Act of 1988, supra note 4, § 301(c)(1)(A)-(B).
77 Id. § 301(c)(5)(A).
78 Id. § 301(a)(3).
79 Id. § 301(c)(3)(A).
80 Id. § 301(c)(3)(B).
81 Id. § 302(a). "Interested person" is defined as including "domestic firms and
workers, representatives of consumer interests, United States product exporters ...." Id.
§ 301(d)(9). Also, interested parties must have a "significant" interest. 15 C.F.R.
§ 2006.0(b)(1988).
82 Trade Act of 1988, supra note 4, § 302(b).
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has an agreement; the product or service subject to the foreign act;
and that the foreign acts are unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discrimi-
natory, and that they burden or restrict U.S. commerce. 83 Within
forty-five days of receipt of the petition the USTR must decide
whether to initiate an investigation and he must notify the petitioner
and publish the determination, with the reasons therefor, in the Fed-
eral Register. 84 If an investigation is initiated, the USTR must notify
the foreign country and request consultation of the policies at is-
sue.85 If the results of the investigation are affirmative (i.e., that re-
taliation is warranted), the USTR must declare within a specified
time the action to be taken.86 The statute also contains various pro-
visions regarding consultation with U.S. agencies and industries, 87
public hearings,88 and modification and termination of the retalia-
tory action.8 9
D. Section 301 in Practice
Initially, section 301 petitions for governmental retaliation were
uncommon. In recent years, however, the use of section 301 as a
tool for opening markets has increased dramatically. For example,
before September 1985, only forty-eight investigations were started
under section 301. 90 Private parties initiated each of these.9 1 In
contrast, from September 1985 to April 1986 the President or the
USTR initiated ten investigations 9 2 and private parties petitioned for
retaliation in six other cases. 9 3 This indicates both an increased
awareness by the Reagan Administration of the potential effective-
ness of section 301 and a willingness to use section 301 vigorously to
open new markets.
The tobacco industry has been involved with section 301 on five
83 15 C.F.R. § 2006.1 (1988).
84 Trade Act of 1988, supra note 4, § 302(a)(2)-(4).
85 Id. § 303(a)(1).
86 Id. § 304(a)(2). If the case involves a trade agreement, the action will be declared
the earlier of 30 days after the conclusion of the dispute settlement procedure, or 18
months after the investigation was initiated. If the case was initiated by the USTR, then
the action shall be declared within six months after the investigation was initiated. For all
other cases the action shall be declared within 12 months of the initiation of the
investigation.
87 Id. § 304(b).
88 Id.
89 Id. § 307. This section was added by the 1988 amendments and it is relevant if the
§ 301 (a)(2) exemptions apply, if the action is no longer appropriate, or if the effect on U.S.
commerce has changed. It should be noted that good faith petitions for investigation
under § 301 will rarely be denied (only one denial prior to 1987, see Roses, Inc., 50 Fed.
Reg. 40,250 (1985)), but often the reasons for a § 301 investigation will disappear as a
result of negotiations and § 307 modifications or termination will be appropriate.
90 Int'l Trade Rep. Reference File (BNA), Section on Presidential Retaliation, Refer-






occasions. 94 The USTR has initiated investigations for the industry
twice9 5 and the tobacco industry initiated three additional cases.9 6
The first use of section 301 on behalf of the tobacco industry
occurred on March 14, 1979, when the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations 97 received from the Cigar Association of
America, Inc. (CAA), a petition alleging unfair trade practices by Ja-
pan.98 The petition alleged unreasonable import restrictions bur-
dening U.S. commerce in cigars. 99 The unreasonable restrictions
included the following: (1) A minimum testing period of from one to
two years; (2) a ban on private press releases about the product; (3)
advertising only to inform of price changes; and (4) a ban on infor-
mation about the product except in the Japanese tobacco monop-
oly's catalog for imported brands. 10 0 The CAA alleged that if the
United States could achieve a fifty-five percent reduction in the artifi-
cially elevated retail price of cigars in Japan and could eliminate the
import restrictions noted above, then U.S. cigar exports could grow
by more than five million dollars within just a few years.'10
In October 1979 the Associated Tobacco Manufacturers (ATM)
also submitted a section 301 petition alleging unreasonable trade
practices by Japan. 0 2 The alleged unreasonable actions set forth in
the ATM petition were substantially similar to the allegations in the
CAA petition, but also included the allegation that their imported
pipe tobacco was authorized to be sold in fewer than 3,800 of the
250,000 retail markets in Japan and that minimum delivery require-
ments imposed on the outlets further restricted sales of imported
tobacco.' 0 3 The ATM petition also indicated that the current (1979)
market share of pipe tobacco, estimated at $240,000, could be ex-
panded to $12,000,000 if reasonable pricing schemes were adopted
and if the marketing restrictions were eliminated. 0 4
Because of their substantial similarity, the USTR consolidated
the CAA and ATM petitions 0 5 and began negotiations with Japan.
These negotiations produced an agreement between the United
States and Japan before U.S. retaliation occurred and even before a
special GATT panel determined whether or not the Japanese prac-
94 See infra notes 98-120 and accompanying text.
95 See infra notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
96 See infra notes 98-107, 115-120 and accompanying text.
97 The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations is now referred to as the
United States Trade Representative.
98 44 Fed. Reg. 19,083 (1979).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 19,084.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 64,938.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 64,939.
105 46 Fed. Reg. 1,388-89 (1979).
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tices violated GATT. 10 6 The agreement reduced tariffs on imported
pipe tobacco and cigars and liberalized other restrictions including
those on advertising and distribution. 0 7
The USTR initiated a second investigation of the Japanese mar-
ket on behalf of the tobacco industry on September 16, 1985.108
The focus of the investigation was, again, on the high tariffs, discrim-
inatory rules on marketing and distribution (including a prohibition
on foreign manufacture of cigarettes in Japan), and the maintenance
of a government monopoly on the import and sale of tobacco.' 0 9
After discussing the investigation with the domestic tobacco indus-
try, the USTR consulted withJapan. Without having to impose retali-
atory tariffs or quotas, Japan agreed that tariffs on cigarettes would
be reduced to zero, that the discriminatory excise tax payments by
the monopoly would be eliminated, and that the discriminatory dis-
tribution practices would stop. l I"
On October 27, 1986, President Reagan initiated a section 301
investigation on behalf of the tobacco industry when he proclaimed
in a memorandum for the USTR that "acts, policies, and practices by
... Taiwan regarding the distribution and sale of United States...
tobacco products are unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory
and burden or restrict United States commerce."I I The President
noted that Taiwan had failed to abide by an agreement made in 1985
to ". . . allow United States products to be sold in all retail outlets
where Taiwanese products were sold, (3) permit the retail prices of
imports to be marked up at no greater rate than the prices for do-
mestic products, and (4) allow market forces to determine the impor-
tation of these products."''1 2 The President then directed the USTR
to propose "proportional countermeasures" against Taiwan." 3 In
this case, as in the preceeding ones, Taiwan agreed to cease the of-
fending unfair trade practices soon after the initiation of a section
301 investigation. 14
Another recent section 301 petition by the U.S. tobacco industry
was filed onJanuary 22, 1988,"15 and the USTR initiated an investi-
gation on February 16, 1988.116 The U.S. Cigarette Export Associa-
tion (CEA) alleged that South Korean policies restrict open and
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1985).
109 Id.
110 51 Fed. Reg. 35,995-96 (1986).
I Id. at 39,639.
112 Id.
''3 Id.
114 Id. at 44,958. The Presidential Memorandum also condemned Taiwanese policies
regarding beer and wine.
''5 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 4 at 105 (Jan. 27, 1988).
116 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 7 at 206 (Feb. 17, 1988).
[VOL. 14
INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO TRADE
nondiscriminatory access to tobacco markets and cause an estimated
loss of over $500 million of potential exports each year." 17 The peti-
tion alleged the following unfair trade practices: Retail prices of im-
ported cigarettes fixed at a prohibitive level through tariffs and taxes;
a one percent annual quota on imports; the existence of a tobacco
manufacturing monopoly; the denial of licenses and investment by
foreign firms; a domestic monopoly on the import of cigarettes; the
imposition of an unreasonably low retail margin; and a ban on al-
most all advertising and promotion. 1 8
The case against South Korea was settled without retaliation in a
manner similar to prior section 301 cases. On May 9, 1988, less than
three months after the investigation was initiated, South Korea
agreed to reduce the tax on imported cigarettes from 1,000 won to
360 won, to allow U.S. firms to import cigarettes into South Korea
and sell them independently of the Korean tobacco monopoly, and
to allow all retail outlets carrying Korean brands also to carry U.S.
brands."19 In addition, the USTR announced that foreign firms
would now be permitted to advertise and conduct sales
promotions.12 0
E. Discussion of Section 301
Compared to other industries, the tobacco industry has made
fairly liberal use of section 301 as a negotiating tool to help force
open new markets and achieve trade concessions in existing markets.
It is curious, though, that more use of section 301 does not occur
given the relatively broad and flexible authority that is available.
On behalf of section 301 it should be noted that perhaps no
other remedy is so clearly intended to help U.S. exporters.121 Unlike
antidumping and countervailing duty laws, section 301 reserves a
great deal of discretion for the USTR in order to maximize the
chances for an effective remedy. In addition, whereas other reme-
dies respond to the effects of foreign products within the United
States, section 301 looks beyond U.S. borders and seeks to improve
our domestic industries by achieving international market access and
fair trade.' 2 2 Most important, unlike the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws, there is no judicial review of section 301 action and
no rigid criteria to meet before an investigation may begin. 123
117 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 4 at 105. CEA said that South Korea unfairly re-
stricted U.S. market share to only 0.06% of the $2.1 billion market in 1986.
118 Id.
119 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 19 at 684 (May 11, 1988).
120 Id.
121 Bello & Holmer, Section 301 Recent Developments and Proposed Amendments, 35 FED. B.
NEWS &J. 68 (1988).
122 See Bello & Holmer, supra note 6, at 211.
123 Bello & Holmer, supra note 121, at 69.
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The wide scope and flexibility of section 301 make it a valuable
asset for trade negotiation. Investigations under section 301 may be
initiated either by the USTR or by a class of broadly defined "inter-
ested persons."' 24 In addition, the showing necessary to warrant an
investigation under section 301 is easily met.' 25 Further, the discre-
tion available to the USTR, though now eliminated in some cases,
enables him to evaluate a number of factors before deciding whether
and how to retaliate.126
Another positive side-effect of section 301 is that even if retalia-
tion does not occur, the federal government becomes more sensitive
to the trade barriers faced by domestic exporters. In this respect,
section 301 is one way for a private industry to help put trade with a
particular area of the world on the government's agenda for future
trade policy..
Section 301 is often criticized as being essentially a protectionist
device that curtails trade rather than expands it. Because most of the
remedies available under section 301 are protectionist, this criticism
has merit on its face. A closer look, however, reveals a different
story. First, as illustrated by the section 301 cases involving tobacco,
most section 301 'investigations do not result in actual retaliation;
therefore, protectionist remedies such as tariffs and quotas are rarely
imposed as a direct result of section 301.127 In fact, it is argued that
the threatened use of section 301 to block access to U.S. markets is
much more effective than actual retaliation. 128  Section 301, when
threatened by the President or USTR in negotiations with foreign
countries,.may also allay protectionist sentiment in Congress so that
actual retaliation does not occur.' 29 From this viewpoint, section
301 can be portrayed as, at least in part, antiprotectionist. Finally,
124 Trade Act of 1988, supra note 4, § 302. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
The potential for a private party to participate actively in the investigation of international
trade practices and to help open new markets for exporting industries is one of the most
remarkable aspects of § 301. It is a prime means by which private individuals may help
shape the direction and priorities of U.S. trade policy. Whether such participation is an
impermissible intrusion on the power of the executive and legislative branches, however,
is another consideration that is subject to debate.
125. For example, a petitioner may merely allege and demonstrate unjustifiable, unrea-
sonable, or discriminatory acts by a foreign government that restrict U.S. commerce. See
Trade Act of 1988, supra note 4, § 301(a)(i)(B)(ii),(2).
126 The USTR, in his discretion, may consider the progress a foreign government is
making towards open trade (or alternatively its intractability), the availability of reciprocal
benefits to foreigners in the United States, the political appropriateness of retaliation
(both domestically and internationally), the economic consequences to other domestic in-
dustries and consumers, and the possibility of risks to national security. He also may con-
sider other factors relevant to the consequences of and need for retaliation. Id.
§ 301 (a)(2)
127 See Bronckers, Private Response to Foreign Unfair Trade Practices-United States and EEC
Complaint Procedures, 6 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 651, 666 (1984).
128 Bello & Holmer, supra note 121, at 70.
1') Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility Against Alleged Unfair Trade
Practices by the Japanese Government, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 492, 523 (1987).
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whether or not section 301 is a vehicle for protectionism, the fact
remains that foreign countries, when faced with investigation and the
threat of retaliation under section 301, have generally agreed to re-
duce tariffs and eliminate or liberalize trade restrictions.
Criticism of section 301, on the other hand, is easily targeted at
some of the limitations in the statutory language itself. First, section
301 is a remedy only for unfair trade practices conducted by a for-
eign government. Thus, private actions by foreigners such as collu-
sion or predatory pricing are not actionable under section 301. This
means that U.S. industries being affected by such practices must con-
tinue to operate, if at all, at a competitive disadvantage. A second
limitation within the statute is the fact that the process of filing a
petition, initiating an investigation, consulting with domestic indus-
tries and the foreign nation, deciding which action to take, and actu-
ally implementing the action, may be too cumbersome and slow to
provide timely relief for the restricted industry. A third criticism of
section 301 is that the very flexibility that makes it so useful (e.g., the
broadness of the "unreasonableness" grounds for investigation) also
makes section 301 susceptible to potential abuse by industries, the
President, or the USTR. 130 For example, this flexibility may allow
the President to assuage protectionist demands by the public or Con-
gress by beginning a section 301 investigation for purely political
reasons having nothing to do with the economics of the situation.' 3 '
Another major source of criticism of section 301 is that it is an
under-utilized statute that achieves few results. Section 301 certainly
was not used very aggressively prior to 1985.132 Further, even when
section 301 is used, the normal result is merely negotiation with the
foreign country ending in an agreement to reduce barriers. These
agreements are often ignored by the foreign country, resulting in a
new investigation under section 301 and a new agreement. 33 In
some cases the threat of section 301 may be useless against a foreign
country because of the low amounts of imports by the United States
from that country. For example, the potential export market for the
U.S. cigarette industry may be large but an offending country with no
U.S. market share risks no loss. The retaliatory threat may also be
IS0 The delegation of power in § 301 may be criticized as too broad. See generally Ken-
nedy, Presidential Authority Under Section 337, Section 301, and the Escape Clause: The Case for
Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127 (1987).
131 See Note, supra note 64, at 1134.
132 Int'l Trade Rep. Reference File (BNA), Section on Presidential Retaliation, Refer-
ence Table 1, 49:080 1. The § 301 Table of Cases reflects the relatively infrequent use of
§ 301 before September 1985.
133 For example, recall the cases involving unfair trade practices by Japan discussed
supra notes 98-110, in which two U.S. tobacco associations petitioned for § 301 action
againstJapan. An investigation was initiated and an agreement was reached before retalia-
tion occurred. The problem remained, however, as indicated by the fact that the USTR
felt compelled to initiate his own investigation under § 301 only five years later. This case
resulted in a preretaliation agreement also.
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empty if the United States either already has high tariffs or if the
United States is perceived as unwilling to back up the threat of
retaliation.
The inevitable, and perhaps most important, criticism of any
statute like section 301 is that it is protectionist. The negative side of
protectionist measures such as tariffs and quotas is that when they
are placed on foreign goods or services, the foreign products be-
come more expensive for domestic consumers and trade as a whole
is diminished. Thus, when section 301 retaliation occurs, infrequent
as it may be, U.S. consumers are forced either to pay more for for-
eign products or must be satisfied with products of lower quality. To
some degree this may benefit a domestic industry that is competing
with the imported goods, but in many cases that may not be the same
industry that sought the original section 301 relief.'3 4 The trade
minimizing results under section 301 are especially objectionable
given the purpose and goals of the statute: "[to enforce] the nation's
right to take political action in pursuit of national economic interests
that will enforce or expand international trade."' 135 In fact, it is
ironic that a statute intended to enforce free trade and open markets
seeks to achieve that goal by closing or threatening to close its own
markets. Indeed, often the U.S. actions being threatened are strik-
ingly similar to the foreign practices complained of and are in viola-
tion of GATT.
IV. Conclusion
Even apart from the trading benefits of comparative advantage
and an expanded market, there are many reasons why U.S. exporters
are anxious to exploit the opportunities of international trade in to-
bacco. The primary aim here has been to contrast some aspects of
the international market (e.g., increasing levels of consumption in
markets that include over one-half of the world's population) with
the relatively stagnant domestic market characterized by decline in
per capita consumption of tobacco, increasing awareness of health
risks of tobacco use, greater legislative regulation of the tobacco in-
dustry, and newly realized possibilities of tort liability.
The pressures for expanded exports of tobacco are powerful,
but so are the barriers to trade. For the exporting tobacco industry
section 301 has emerged as a possible remedy to these barriers. It is
a bittersweet remedy, however, that is more effective when
threatened than when used. It is a remedy that, when used, creates
134 In addition, to the extent foreign goods are produced more efficiently than domes-
tic goods the tariffs or quotas act as indirect subsidies to a relatively inefficient method of
production. This may be acceptable in the case of infant industries, but not for longstand-
ing industries whose inefficiency is well established. Also, the tariffs and quotas work to
distort the market and minimize the advantages of free trade.135 Note, supra note 64, at 1127.
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the same type of barriers that it was intended to remove. It is a rem-
edy that depends for its effectiveness upon the opponent's own de-
sire for access to U.S. markets. Yet, despite its flaws, section 301 was
intended to help private exporters gain better market access and in
many cases that result has been accomplished. Negotiations carried
out under the threat of section 301 sanctions have been favorable to
the United States. The Prdsident and the USTR have been willing to
use section 301 with increasing frequency and Congress has worked,
through recent amendments, to ensure a more aggressive use of sec-
tion 301. All things considered, section 301 is very likely to play a
significant role in future efforts to open foreign markets for U.S. to-
bacco products as well as virtually all other exports.
In this context, it is appropriate to consider some unanswered
questions regarding the results of successful use of section 301 by
the tobacco industry. For example, what will be the future of foreign
tobacco markets? Will these markets continue to expand despite the
growing awareness of health risks or will they grow hostile like some
aspects of the U.S. market? Does the United States have a responsib-
lity to ensure that exports of tobacco products contain warnings
about health risks? Will foreign countries create and enforce label-
ling requirements?S 6 Should the United States threaten use of sec-
tion 301 in order to force those countries to minimize such
requirements? Will there be liability for U.S. manufacturers if and
when foreign tobacco consumers contract cancer? Are there anti-
trust implications for action taken by the federal government on be-
half of private domestic firms?' 3 7 These questions and more are
sure to arise in conjunction with the use of section 301 in pursuit of
foreign markets for U.S. tobacco.
FRED H. JONES
136 See FINGER, supra note 9, at 303 (Appendix 27A: Major Actions Taken by Countries on
Smoking and Health).
137 See Sims & Scott, Antitrust Consequences to Private Parties of Participation In and Settlement
of Selected Trade Actions, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 561 (1987).
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